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Abstract
The Chinese government's decision to push for large-scale build up of renewable 
energy capacity was followed by a range of industrial policies to support this 
change of track. Most importantly, various forms of subsidies were launched to 
support both industries and markets. While important new research has added 
to our understanding of China's state capitalism by documenting the depth and 
breadth of subsidies to solar PV manufactures, very little attention has been paid 
to how subsidies are determined and how companies inﬂuence these processes. 
This article takes a neo-institutional perspective with the aim of understanding 
the institutional context for the interplay between companies and Party-state, 
and the norms established through this interaction. It explores two cases, the 
biomass and solar industry, and shows how subsidies are perceived as being 
negotiable. Understanding this negotiability of subsidies as an institutional-
ized norm helps us understand both an important factor shaping China's 
renewable energy sector and the wider dynamics of state capitalism in China. 
Keywords: China, Renewable energy, Subsidies, Neo-institutional theory, State capitalism
Introduction
Amidst rapidly increasing energy consumption and emission of green-
house gases China has also emerged as the world's biggest investor in 
renewable energy. At the heart of China's effort to develop renewable 
energy are its subsidy schemes. As in any other country, there can be 
no large scale renewable energy without subsidies. Despite its economic 
might, the Chinese state still has funding limitations and needs to con-
sider and prioritize where and what to subsidize. This makes subsidiza-
tion a delicate question, not least for companies that require subsidies 
as a precondition to the existence of a market. Subsidies, therefore, have 
become the focal point for the industry, with crucial formative effects 
on market size and the investment horizon. 
Important new research has documented the scale of subsidies to 
capital-intensive industries in China and has thereby drawn further 
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attention to an already hot topic in international trade  (Haley and Ha-
ley 2013). However, questions about how speciﬁc subsidies are decided 
upon and, in particular, why they are allocated in speciﬁc ways, is not 
explored further than pointing to state capitalism as the most appropri-
ate framework for understanding the role of subsidies (Ibid.: 21-28). 
The state capitalism perspective emphasizes the role of the state in lead-
ing economic development in China  (Aligica and Tarko 2012; Brenner 
2010). While this article concurs with the basic tenets of the state capital-
ism perspective, it proposes a neo-institutional analysis as a way to bring 
attention to the norms and cognitive schemes governing the renewables 
sector. This position enables a more comprehensive discussion of the 
rationales and logics in play and, in turn, elucidates the mechanisms and 
dynamics that give weight to the concept of state capitalism itself. 
Through case studies of biomass and solar PV companies, this article 
demonstrates that subsidies are perceived to be negotiable. Viewing this 
negotiability of subsidies as a norm rather than a stand-alone phenom-
enon adds to our understanding of the workings of the renewable energy 
sector. This article offers empirical insights into the role of subsidies, 
which are relevant to a growing number of companies—both Chinese 
and foreign—that aspire to succeed in China's renewable energy mar-
kets. This information can be important, for example, when making 
assessments regarding future subsidies, when lobbying for the issuance 
of subsidies, and when designing informed business strategies for the 
longer term.  
When studying subsidization in an institutional perspective, attention 
must be paid to the wider context; institutionalization processes never 
take place in a vacuum. In this instance, the context will be examined 
through the concept of organizational ﬁelds, deﬁned as a 'community 
of organizations that partakes of a common meaning system and whose 
participants interact more frequently and faithfully with one another 
than with actors outside of the ﬁeld' (Scott 2008: 86). The organizational 
ﬁeld of renewable energy in China comprises companies, various gov-
ernment agencies, China's Communist Party, business associations, 
and NGOs (Christensen 2013: 104-106). Moreover, renewable energy 
in China can be described as an emergent, and the structuration of the 
ﬁeld is ongoing and open-ended  (Maguire et al. 2004: 659; Fligstein 
1997; Gray 1985: 912).
The article is structured in three main sections. First, recent studies on 
subsidies are discussed and shortcomings in the literature are identiﬁed. 
Secondly, two case studies and the related methodological issues are 
_______________________________________________________________________ 109
______________________________ Subsidization in China's Renewable Energy Sector
presented. Thirdly, the case ﬁndings are discussed from a neo-institu-
tional perspective and, ﬁnally, some conclusions are offered. 
The Literature on Subsidies 
Within the neo-classical economic paradigm, subsidies are understood 
as state interventions in the functioning of the free market. States inter-
fere in markets in many ways and on many grounds. All governments 
of market economies have, for instance, adopted and implemented 
competition laws: a set of rules that specify the national conditions 
for competition in legal terms. Due to the huge differences in the size 
between national economies, these vary a lot from state to state. On a 
more general level, states shape the foundations of any modern economy 
through the establishment of educational systems and rule of law (or 
rule by law, as it is practiced in China); they shape the frameworks for 
markets through labour market regulations, competition law, bank-
ruptcy laws and property rights; and they intervene directly through 
innovation and industrial policymaking like subsidization (North 1981: 
206). In the Western world, however, many of these direct interventions 
have been limited due to the dominance of the new classical economics 
and its belief in the ability of the free market to regulate itself in the most 
efﬁcient way (Wade 1990: 13). This is reﬂected, for instance, in the West-
ern-dominated trade regime governed by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), which prohibits trade in subsidized goods (regulated under the 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy sections). 
In the new classical economic literature, we ﬁnd two main arguments 
that justify state interventions. Firstly, it is argued that industries in 
their infancy could beneﬁt from both subsidies (to develop technologies, 
for example) and high tariff barriers, as a way to protect the industry 
from being exposed to competition from the world market before it has 
achieved better economies of scale (Chang 2002: 243). These measures 
would, however, be accepted only as short-term arrangements aimed 
at bringing the industry out of its infancy. Secondly, subsidies can be 
defended as a way of supporting industries with fewer negative exter-
nalities than the existing alternatives. This would very much apply to 
renewable energy, as subsidies make it a viable substitute for coal-based 
energy production, which has lots of negative externalities, such as pol-
lution and climate change, on the surrounding society.       
These two justiﬁcations of subsidies notwithstanding, the issue of 
interventions in (free) market operation seems to be contested in most, 
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if not all, Western societies. On the one hand, public or political pres-
sure in favour of interference (e.g. protectionist measures) can easily 
be mobilized in times of crisis. On the other hand, the argument that 
interference of any kind in free market operations is harmful (i.e. less 
efﬁcient in the long run) is also an easily accessible political platform, 
though its popularity varies over time and across nation states. In China, 
the one-party rule does not leave room for any political lines of conﬂict 
with regard to state interventions in the shape of subsidization. Instead, 
the key issue is how subsidization in particular, and interventions in 
general, are perceived and executed by the ruling party. I will return 
to these aspects throughout the article.
Subsidies for renewable energy in China come in many forms. From 
the subtle 'favourable lending environment' orchestrated by the state-
owned banks to the overt and rule-based reimbursements of installa-
tion costs and extra premiums paid by the state per kWh of renewable 
energy produced. The speciﬁc forms of subsidization for biomass and 
solar power will be discussed in the two case studies that follow.
 The most recent study of subsidization of China's industry is Haley 
and Haley's analysis of subsidies for four capital-intensive industries: 
steel, glass, paper and auto-parts  (Haley and Haley 2013). Their starting 
point is the apparent paradox that China has gained a competitive edge 
in developing capital-intensive industries, when the country's compara-
tive advantage was cheap labour. Haley and Haley explain this apparent 
paradox in terms of subsidization, and are able to construct a model for 
measuring the actual scale of subsidies to particular industries. However, 
when closing in on the motives and reasoning behind the documented 
efforts by the Chinese state, the existing economic literature offers few 
insights. Economic (textbook) rationales in favour of subsidies are scarce, 
and the overwhelming consensus points to the distortion they cause and 
the fact that they lead to inefﬁcient allocation of resources. Thus China's 
behaviour cannot be explained by an economic rationale. As Haley and 
Haley put it: 'when governmental decisions to grant subsidies have lit-
tle to do with efﬁciency considerations, as in China, economic analysis 
based on welfare analysis offers few insights'  (Haley and Haley 2013: 
10). Instead they seek sociopolitical rationales for Chinese subsidies and 
arrive at a state capitalist perspective. In state capitalism, interventions 
in market operations are an embedded part of the model, and the state 
takes on a leading role in guiding economic development, through state 
owned enterprises as key players in selected sectors, for instance (Aligica 
and Tarko 2012; Brenner 2010; Screpanti 1999; Evans 1995).
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While state capitalism is a useful concept that emphasizes certain criti-
cal features of China's political-economic system, it remains a theoretical 
abstraction. In order to understand the actual rationales and sources of 
legitimacy on which real decisions are based on a societal level, more ﬁne-
grained and operational theoretical tools are needed. Neo-institutional 
theory, with its strong focus on empirical studies, fulﬁls this requirement 
(Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Neo-institutional theory allows for analysis 
of the norms governing subsidization and the deeply institutionalized 
cultural-cognitive schemes and logics that make up the systems of mean-
ing underpinning renewable energy in China (Scott 2014). 
Case Studies 
Methodological Implications
The two case studies presented here are informed by two relatively 
brief periods of ﬁeldwork in Beijing and Shanghai in October 2008 and 
July 2009, respectively. The use of case studies has been recognized as 
a viable method when the research has an explanatory aim, as in this 
case (Yin 1994). 
The ﬁrst ﬁeld trip speciﬁcally targeted one company, Dragon Power, 
which builds and operates biomass power plants. The second trip had 
a broader aim and targeted mainly solar (PV) power companies in 
the Shanghai area. The data derived from the two ﬁeld trips consists 
of written material provided by the companies and a total of sixteen 
interviews, of which thirteen were with business people on both ex-
ecutive and management levels, two were with NGOs, and one with a 
government agency. 
The ﬁrst case is based on six interviews with most of the executive level 
employees of Dragon Power, as well as the founder of the company, one 
board member, and one government director from the National Devel-
opment and Reform Commission (NDRC). The ﬁrst pilot interview was 
conducted with the board member (who is Danish), who later helped to 
open the door to access the executive level in Dragon Power. Notably, 
it only took a few interviews before the same key company storylines 
began to be repeated. This was likely due to the relatively small group 
of executives working closely together on a daily basis. Saturation was 
therefore achieved on the basis of these few focused interviews with 
relevant informants who were well-positioned to discuss the decisions 
and events targeted by the case study.    
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The second case study is based on ten interviews with managers from 
four different solar (PV) producers (Suntech Power Holding 2, Solarfun 
Power Holding 1, Shanghai Topsolar Green Energy Company 1, Eoplly 
New Energy Technology 2), representatives from two renewable en-
ergy associations (Chinese Renewable Energy Industries Association 
(CREIA), and Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Partnership 
(REEEP)), one interview with the vice president of Suzlon Energy (the 
Beijing branch ofﬁce of an Indian wind turbine producer), and one 
interview with a manager at China Huaneng Corporation, one of 'the 
big ﬁve' energy companies in China. The aim of this line of interviews 
was to attain a broader understanding of renewable energy in the ﬁeld 
and especially the solar (PV) industry's market situation and relations 
with government agencies.     
As noted above, the two case studies are primarily based on these 
interviews. However, it is impossible to rely solely on interview data 
due to the relatively limited sample. Furthermore, all companies have 
an interest in presenting themselves in a favourable light and this could 
lead to a company-centric worldview and bias in how they describe their 
own role and impact. To compensate for the bias and limited number 
of informants a number of steps were taken. First, with regard to the 
Dragon Power case, an interview with the director of NDRC (Dragon 
Power's main government counterpart) was organized. As interviews 
with NDRC staff are notoriously difﬁcult to obtain, this provided a rare 
opportunity to cross-check Dragon Power's explanations of their deal-
ings with NDRC. Secondly, written material—for instance the 'Louyang 
Declaration', which ﬁgures prominently in the second case study—was 
used to check chronology and accuracy of wording, and to conﬁrm the 
information obtained through the interviews. Third, it is worth noting 
that the issues dealt with in both case studies are easy to verify, and 
were not considered controversial by the informants.
Case 1: Biomass   
Before 2006 there were no subsidies for power produced through 
biomass combustion. In fact, as late as 2003, biomass was not even 
mentioned in ofﬁcial Chinese documents on renewable energy.1 Today, 
biomass power is economically feasible in China due to a state subsidy. 
The subsidy is therefore the point of rotation for this business and a 
key condition for biomass companies' ability to compete with coal ﬁred 
power plants. The speciﬁc subsidy was introduced in 2006 and is called 
a feed-in tariff. It is basically a premium price that the state pays per 
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kWh produced on top of the standard price of electricity (which is, at 
least in the longer run, based on the price of coal). 
Also in 2006, Dragon Power established the Shanxian plant, the ﬁrst 
biomass (straw-ﬁred) power plant in China. This ﬁrst plant was, how-
ever, the product of a three year process in which the founder of Dragon 
Power, Kai Johan Jiang, and a few colleagues had worked intensively 
to acquire a special license from the NDRC that would allow them to 
build power plants with a capacity below the national threshold of 50 
MW. By 2011, Dragon Power had built and was operating 19 biomass 
power plants, had an additional 13 in the pipeline and employed 8000 
people. They had become the biggest biomass power company not only 
in China, but in the world. In the Chinese market they were without 
any signiﬁcant competitors. And as an illustration of Dragon Power's 
entrepreneurial nature it is worth noting that the establishment of the 
Shanxian plant was initiated before any subsidy was in place. 
In the 'Renewable Energy Law' document, biomass power is listed 
alongside hydro, wind and solar as one of four sources of renewable 
energy recognized in China (Renewable Energy Law 2007). Through 
this law the Chinese state commits itself to promote biomass and, as 
promised, just after it was promulgated a feed-in tariff on RMB 0.25 per 
kWh was granted. 
When explaining Dragon Power's short history, its president, Simon 
Parker, mentioned Dragon Power's inﬂuence on the crucial renewable 
energy law and the subsidy: 
'There were people within our organization who were actually involved in 
drafting, commenting on the Renewable Energy Law… the creation of the 
law, which gives… it is for any company who would qualify for it, but we 
were… at the inception of the creation of an industry [biomass] in China 
[when] we made Dragon Power…'2 
In this quotation Simon Parker hints at the fact that the main beneﬁciary 
of this subsidy was and remains Dragon Power. 
In a subsequent interview with the director of NDRC it was conﬁrmed 
that Dragon Power did indeed introduce biomass to China (and the 
NDRC).3 And, as noted, this is also evidenced by the fact that biomass 
is not even mentioned in ofﬁcial documents published by the NDRC 
as late as 2003. NDRC is the main government agency for exercising 
government interests and implementing projects in the energy sector 
(as well as all other politically prioritized sectors) and it has remained 
Dragon Power's main government counterpart throughout the compa-
ny's short history. 
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In the follow up to the Renewable Energy Law called Medium and 
Long Term Renewable Energy Development Plan published in August 
2007, it was stipulated that China should reach an installed capacity of 
5.5 GW in 2010 and 30 GW by 2020 (NDRC 2007a).4 To reach at least the 
short term milestone the Chinese state (and NDRC as the responsible 
agency) was therefore totally depending on Dragon Power's success.5 
Moreover, without a continuous build up of Dragon Power's capacity 
it will be impossible to reach the longer-term target. 
The subsidy of RMB 0.25 per kWh was, according to the president 
of Dragon Power, just a ﬁrst attempt to ﬁnd a reasonable price level. 
A few years later, when it became apparent that Dragon Power would 
struggle to make a proﬁtable business, another RMB 0.10 of premium 
was added to the existing subsidy. Again, Dragon Power was the sole 
beneﬁciary. Asked directly about Dragon Power's inﬂuence on this extra 
premium, Simon Parker stated:
'I don't have anything that can tangibly show that to be the case. What you 
can see is since the creation of the industry and the Renewable Energy Law 
was devised there have been additional incentives provided for biomass at 
a couple of different stages to ensure that the revenue receipts enabled the 
industry to be viable. And when you talk about the industry at the moment, 
NBE [a Dragon Power subsidiary] is 80–90% of the biomass industry. So 
other than connecting the dots…' 
Speciﬁcally on this extra premium, the director of NDRC stated: 
'Prices have gone up, for instance on steel used in the construction. It was 
difﬁcult to do business so we talked to Dragon Power'.6 
This commentary shows exactly how involved Dragon Power was 
in establishing and (upwardly) adjusting this subsidy in very close 
relationship with NDRC.It is also important to notice that this was no 
trivial matter, as a subsidy was a 'make or break' factor for this particu-
lar company in terms of its ability to compete with other renewable 
energy solutions and non-renewable coal based energy production. In 
China, close connections to government agencies are openly afﬁrmed 
as a company asset. This was reﬂected in all the interviews I conducted 
for both case studies, although the actual extent of business inﬂuence 
on government agencies is another matter. In this particular case, it is 
signiﬁcant and reveals the extent of NDRC's dependence on Dragon 
Power to reach the short term milestone. This dependence also meant 
that the normally quite asymmetrical relationship between the pow-
erful NDRC and a single company was levelled out, and could more 
accurately be described as a negotiation between equal partners.       
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Case 2: Solar Power
The second case study focuses on the part of the renewable energy indus-
try that deals with solar power or, more narrowly deﬁned, with photo 
voltaic (PV) energy. In 2008 the Chinese solar industry was exporting 
between 90 to 95 per cent of its production to other markets, mainly Ger-
many and Spain (United Steel 2010: 195). The Chinese market for solar 
power was therefore negligible and had not been an important driver 
for the massive industrial expansion that had already taken place.7 So 
for these solar power companies, which were mostly privately owned 
and located in China because of the low (and, according to Haley and 
Haley, highly subsidized) production costs, a boost to their home market 
would be enormously helpful, not least in the midst of a global economic 
downturn (Haley and Haley 2013). 
A solar subsidy for the Chinese market would make it possible for 
solar power to compete with the standard price of electricity, which is 
set by the government and is linked to the price of coal.8 This means that 
a Chinese subsidy, especially a feed-in tariff, would have an immediate 
effect on the size of the market for solar power in China.
In 2001, a Chinese solar engineer named Mr Shi Zhengrong founded 
Suntech and started to manufacture solar cells. By 2007, the company 
had grown to be the world's third largest competitor in solar power and 
was regarded as an industry leader. This also meant that Mr Shi was an 
inﬂuential person in  'green' business. Initiated by Mr Shi, a number of 
the Chinese solar giants including Suntech, LDK, Trina, Solarfun and 
Canadian Solar (all publicly listed companies) got together for a PV in-
dustry meeting on 18 December 2008 where they agreed on an industry 
pricing roadmap. This pricing roadmap was ﬁnalized by Suntech and 
Trina and subsequently handed over to the Chinese Ministry of Science 
and Technology (MOST).9 The roadmap stipulated that the industry 
should make a concerted effort to lower the on-grid solar power price 
to RMB 1 per kilowatt hour (kWh) by 2012. The phrase 'RMB 1 per kWh' 
was coined and promoted by Mr Shi and Suntech. For solar power, 'RMB 
1 per kWh' was said to be the threshold for large-scale commercializa-
tion of this particular energy source. At this level, solar energy would 
be affordable even without subsidies from the state.
The following year, on 28 April at the 2009 China Solar PV Industry 
Annual Conference held in the city of Luoyang, Mr Shi managed to or-
chestrate what became known as the 'Louyang Declaration', which was 
jointly issued by 13 leading Chinese solar photovoltaic companies (see 
below, Louyang Declaration 2009). With this declaration the companies 
116 ___________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 33(1)•2015
Nis Høyrup Christensen _____________________________________________________
committed themselves to lowering prices throughout each stage of the 
production of a solar cell panel and thereby reach the 'RMB 1 per kWh' 
target. At the time of the conference, solar power was priced at about 
RMB 4 per kWh, which was calculated on the basis of production costs 
and the amount of energy a solar module can produce over 20 years, 
the standard warranty period in the business. 
The list above shows that all the biggest companies in the Chinese 
market for solar energy (PV) participated in this meeting. It also shows 
that all types of producers from the whole value chain participated and 
that there were many overlaps, meaning that most of the companies 
were benched alongside their biggest competitors as well as their closest 
partners. Government ofﬁcials from the NDRC were also present at the 
meeting. The particular constellation of actors therefore illustrates that 
the 'Louyang Declaration' and the conference were very much about 
the interests of the sector as a whole. 
When asked about the reasons for promoting the '1 RMB per kWh' 
phrase, a director from Suntech gave the following illustrative and 
rather blunt response: 
'[A] year or two ago Dr Shi started talking about '1 RMB per kWh' as the 
target for solar and at the time people said that was crazy and we won't be 
able to achieve it. But it basically set the benchmark for policy-makers in the 
solar industry to move towards. And now probably everybody believes we 
can do it. And policy-makers also see that as the goal and so the idea is to 
get policy-makers to introduce subsidies that help take us to that point'.11  
In this light, the 'Louyang Declaration' becomes a clear and public 
communication directly targeting the NDRC and MOST. The confer-
ence, and the discussions and preparations that preceded it, become an 
integrative effort where industry and government clarify their respec-
tive positions. A common platform has been established through the 
framing of both the 'RMB 1 per kWh' and the 'Louyang Declaration' as 
ways to further a sustainable use of energy. 
But why has the Chinese government not introduced a subsidy as 
other governments have? Germany and Spain, for instance, have a feed-
in tariff, which means that all owners of a solar module which is con-
nected to the grid are paid for the electricity they produce. When asked 
about this absent Chinese subsidy, the director of Suntech replied: 
'They [the government] thought it was too expensive. You can only set a 
feed-in tariff if it is feasible. They just didn't introduce it until a point where 
it was economically viable.'12 
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TABLE 1. Signatories of the 'Louyang Declaration'10
Suntech Power Co., 
Ltd
Cell, module and  
system production
Headquartered in Wuxi, China. 
Publicly listed on New York Stock 
Exchange
Yingli Green Energy 
Holding Co., Ltd
Ingots, wafers, cell and 
module production
Headquartered in Baoding, China. 
Publicly listed on New York Stock 
Exchange 
JA Solar Holdings Co., 
Ltd
Cell production Headquartered in Shanghai, China. 
Publicly listed on NASDAQ
LDK Solar Co., Ltd Polysilicon, wafers 
production
Headquartered in Xinyu, China. 
Publicly listed on New York Stock 
Exchange
Beijing Jingyuntong 
Technology Co., Ltd
Polysilicon, wafers 
production
Headquartered in Beijing, China. 
China Silicon  
Corporation, Ltd
Polysilicon production Headquartered in Louyang, China 
Sichuan Xinguang 
Silicon Technology Co., 
Ltd
Polysilicon production Headquartered in Leshan, China
Emei Semiconductor 
Materials Factory
Polysilicon production Headquartered in Chengdu, China
Jiangsu Shunda Group Ingots, wafers, cells 
and module  
production
Headquartered in Yangzhou, 
China
No.45 Research  
Institute of China 
Electronics Technology 
Group Corp
Semiconductor  
Equipment
Headquartered in Beijing, China.
Daqo New Energy 
Corp
Polysilicon, ingots,  
wafers, cell and  
module production
Headquartered in Chongqing,  
China.
Publicly listed on New York Stock 
Exchange
GCL-Poly Energy 
Holdings Limited
Polysilicon and wafer 
production
Headquartered in Hong Kong, 
China.
Publicly listed on Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange
China Electronics Tech-
nology Group Corpo-
ration 48th Research 
Institute
Ingots, wafers, cell and 
module production
State Owned Enterprise,  
headquartered in Changsha, China
Thus, the 'Louyang Declaration' is the industry's attempt to show the 
government that they are approaching the point where a subsidy would 
be 'economically viable'.      
Have the 'RMB 1 per kWh' phrase and the 'Louyang Declaration' had 
any effect? This is difﬁcult to assess in the short run, but notably—on 
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23 March 2009, after the 'RMB 1 per kWh' roadmap was presented but 
before the 'Louyang Declaration' was formulated—the Chinese Ministry 
of Finance and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Develop-
ment issued the 'Solar Roof Plan', which subsidizes 'built-in PV' with 
20 RMB/W and 15 RMB/W for roof top applications (both for systems 
with a capacity above 50 kW).13 This kind of subsidy thereby covers 
some of the investment costs. 
In addition, three months after the 'Louyang Declaration', on 21 July 
2009, the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Science and Technology and 
National Energy Administration (which is under the NDRC) issued a 
joint statement that announced a 'Golden Sun' programme. This pro-
gramme targeted demonstration projects and subsidizes 50% of the 
investment costs for on-grid projects and 70 percent of the costs for 
independent projects (United Steel 2010). 
Moreover, in May 2010 a formal alliance, named China Photovoltaic 
Industry Alliance (CPIA), was created. CPIA comprises some of the 
same companies (though not exclusively) that participated in the 
Louyang meeting, along with government bodies like NDRC and 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). Reportedly, 
this alliance was proposed at the Louyang meeting by Wang Bohua, 
director of MIIT.14 CPIA was established with the aim of aligning 
technologies, developing and implementing industry standards, as 
well as enabling a more accurate collection of industry data in order 
to help support government policies to guide the development of the 
industry.15 The alliance therefore signals a commitment to a coopera-
tive relationship in the future. The crucial point is that these meetings 
took place at all, that thinking, facilitating and enacting these events 
made sense to the participants: both companies and government. These 
events therefore bear witness to a shared expectation about the negoti-
ability of subsidies.
Case Findings: Negotiability as the Norm
What do the two case studies tell us about subsidization in China's 
renewable energy industry? The ﬁrst case, Dragon Power, is extreme 
in the sense that the negotiability of the subsidy level is so obvious. 
A feed-in tariff is decided upon and even increased, and all along 
one company is the sole beneﬁciary. With the case of solar power 
companies is less clear-cut, but there is nonetheless an expectation 
of negotiability. This expectation has to some extent been met, given 
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the subsequent launch of subsidy programmes and the establishment 
of a formal alliance between companies and government agencies. 
Moreover, as evidenced by the candid descriptions of these events 
by both companies and Party-state, the negotiation of subsidies is 
obviously deemed appropriate behaviour and negotiability seems to 
be taken for granted. 
From the outset, it is clearly in the interest of companies to engage in 
such negotiations, because they are essentially negotiating to improve 
their ability to perform economically.16 The interesting aspect, however, 
is that this expectation of negotiability is shared by the Party-state. This 
shared expectation, and sense of appropriateness and taken-for-grant-
edness, are strong indicators of an institutionalization of negotiability 
(Scott 2014: 60). It therefore makes sense to view this negotiability as a 
norm underpinning and stipulating the appropriate way to deal with 
subsidies. 
Enabling Negotiability
Where does this norm of negotiability of subsidies come from? How is 
it made possible? On what grounds are these negotiations legitimized? 
In the following these questions are discussed based on the more fun-
damental and deeply institutionalized meaning systems governing the 
area: what Scott describes as the 'cultural-cognitive dimensions'  (Scott 
2014: 67). 
From the outset, and as illustrated by the two case studies, subsidies 
are very much about relations between two of the most fundamental 
logics in contemporary history:  state and market (Friedland and Alford 
1991). In the Chinese context this relationship is complicated by the 
country´s economic past and relatively recent engagement with market 
reforms. The gradual top-down embrace of market mechanisms, the 
ideological overlay and need for ﬂexible handling of different forms 
of ownership (and consequently property rights), the existence and 
persistence of dominant state-owned enterprises with huge market 
shares, and not least the lack of a moral or individualistic platform 
from which the free market in China can be defended, have left the 
borders between state and markets far more malleable than in Western 
economies (Christensen 2010; Nolan 2004: 84, 175). Consequently, the 
Chinese way of handling relations between state and market enables a 
very favourable environment for developing subsidy schemes in order 
to support businesses and maintain high growth rates.
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However, the drive for renewable energy is also important. The 
background for this massive effort, which has propelled China to be-
come the world's biggest investor in renewable energy, is a wide-rang-
ing turn towards a more sustainable development track (Christensen 
2013: 81-100). A more holistic perspective that encompasses economy, 
population, society and environment has been called for from the top of 
the Communist Party of China in order to lessen the impact on natural 
resources and living conditions. These ideals have been brought together 
under the concept of 'sustainable development', which is now used to 
direct and legitimize the large-scale subsidization of renewable energy 
(ibid), including the Renewable Energy Law.   
While the more structural subsidies to capital intensive industries 
documented by Haley and Haley (2013) could be rooted in the malle-
able state-market relation described above, the subsidies for renewable 
energy, and other speciﬁc subsidies for speciﬁc industries, only make 
sense and achieve legitimacy in the context of this turn towards sustain-
able development. The industry simply has to be targeted for special 
attention, which is exactly what has happened with renewable energy 
under the sustainable development drive. On the one hand, this means 
that sustainable development as a new policy direction makes it pos-
sible for companies to 'invite the state in' (with its subsidy schemes), 
as exempliﬁed by the 'Louyang Declaration' (2009). On the other hand, 
it also means that the market logic is degraded further. In the case of 
Dragon Power this was taken to an extreme in the sense that the com-
pany was actually handed a monopoly on biomass in China.17 Thus, 
the particular combination of institutional logics (state and market), as 
well as the comprehensive turn towards more sustainable development, 
is key to understanding the negotiability of subsidies for renewable 
energy in China. 
Negotiability and Bargaining Power
A common theoretical misunderstanding of the notion of a norm is to 
view it as a sphere of social interaction devoid of power relations. Ne-
gotiability is a legitimate way of dealing with subsidies for renewable 
energy in China, and it does not say anything about the actual result of 
the negotiation or the bargaining power that different agents, companies 
and government, entering into negotiations may hold. Negotiability is 
open-ended and there is wide scope for agency in the form of strate-
gizing and leverage of bargaining power (Scott 2014: 94). In the case 
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studies presented above, bargaining power would be deﬁned in terms 
of companies' ability to create growth, jobs and government revenue 
though taxes, as these are important government targets. The ability of 
companies to utilize their network (guanxi) through relevant adminis-
trative units would also determine the bargaining power of companies. 
Moreover, the political weight attributed to sustainable development 
could also inﬂuence the distribution of bargaining power. For instance, 
due to the importance that the Chinese government attaches to fulﬁlling 
its renewable energy targets, Dragon Power could be expected to have 
the upper hand in negotiations, because they were the only company 
with the capacity to meet the biomass target.
Secondly, there is an obvious power play around the norm in the 
sense that the norm only applies to renewable energy companies, 
rather than energy companies in general. Only businesses deﬁned as 
renewable are considered to be legitimate negotiation partners by the 
government. It was therefore a crucial turning point for Dragon Power 
when biomass was listed as a form of renewable energy in the Renew-
able Energy Law.   
Thirdly, the creation of the norm (the institutionalization process) is 
also about a play of power among the involved agents (Scott 2014: 115). 
The enabling conditions discussed above have been used by companies 
to push for negotiations of subsidies and for keeping the door open for 
continued negotiations. However, once the norm is in place the power 
play that preceded it fades from memory and new renewable energy 
companies will not have to push to the same extent for negotiations; 
the door is already open.  
Conclusion 
The neo-institutional perspective makes it possible to see the institu-
tional features of subsidization and thus, the key subject of this study: 
the norm of negotiability of subsidies. On this basis, it can be assumed 
that that the negotiability of subsidies is unlikely to cease in the short-
term, because it has the properties of an institutionalized norm and 
institutions are in general sticky and able to resist change. 
Moreover, on an empirical level the two case studies illustrate that 
the nature of the relationship between companies and the Party-state 
is dynamic and cooperative. While this is a well-known feature of 
relations between companies and Party-state in China, it has not been 
documented with respect to crucial market enabling subsidies, such as 
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the case of biomass. It is therefore reasonable to see this feature as one 
of the key micro-mechanisms that has enabled China's leading position 
within renewable energy. 
This dynamic relationship and the scope of negotiability also has con-
sequences for business strategies in the ﬁeld. Where Haley and Haley's 
work has shown the importance of understanding the role of subsidies 
when assessing markets, production locations and competitiveness 
of rivals (Haley and Haley 2013: 176-178), this study emphasizes how 
bigger companies should not take speciﬁc subsidies at face value when 
they are actually negotiable. And for new or incoming companies with 
new technologies and renewable solutions, both cases have clearly il-
lustrated that completely new subsidies can be launched at short notice. 
The speed and ﬂexibility with which markets can develop in China 
will continue to be a key attraction to companies worldwide. It does, 
however, require that companies are able to tap into policy regimes, 
like sustainable development, as well grasping the more malleable 
state-market relations that characterize the Chinese economy. This 
will remain a particular challenge for new foreign companies entering 
China's renewable energy sector. 
The negotiability of subsidies norm also adds to our understanding 
of the workings of state capitalism in China. It reveals how companies 
are playing a key role in shaping the sector, which suggests a more 
open-ended and less state-orchestrated development than sometimes 
assumed. 
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NOTES
1  Biomass is not mentioned in the ofﬁcial follow up on China's Agenda 21, which is 
called 'Program of Action for Sustainable Development in China in the Early 21st 
Century' and published by the NDRC in 2003 (NDRC 2003).
2  Interview with Simon Parker, President, Dragon Power, Beijing, October 2008.
3  Interview with Liang Zhipeng, Ph.D., Director, Renewable Energy & Rural Power 
Division, Energy Bureau, National Development and Reform Commission, Beijing, 
October 2008.
4  There was 2GW installed capacity by the end of (NDRC 2007).
5  This was also the explicit understanding held by Dragon Power's president. 
6  Interview with Liang Zhipeng, Ph.D., Director, Renewable Energy & Rural Power 
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Division, Energy Bureau, National Development and Reform Commission, Beijing, 
October 2008.
7  The ﬁrst subsidies speciﬁcally aimed at boosting the Chinese market were launched 
in 2009. See 'China's Policies Affecting Trade and Investments in Green Technology' 
(United Steel 2010)
8  Whereas the price on coal ﬂuctuates according to supply and demand, the price of 
electricity is kept stable by the government. 
9  See 'Green Hopes: Energy Law & Plan, Big 5 Subsidized, Installed Wind Doubles' 
at http://greenleapforward.com/2009/02/13/green-hops-energy-law-plan-big-5-
subsidized-installed-wind-doubles/. Accessed 23 April 2015.
10  See 'The Louyang Declaration' (Louyang Declaration 2009).
11   Interview with Rory Macpherson, Investor Relations Director at Suntech Power 
Holdings Co., Ltd., Shanghai, October 2009. 
12   Interview with Rory Macpherson, Investor Relations Director at Suntech Power 
Holdings Co., Ltd., Shanghai, October 2009.
13   These subsidies were also a part of the Chinese government's RMB 4 trillion eco-
nomic stimuli package to boost up the economy after the (Western) ﬁnancial crisis 
and global economic downturn.       
14   See: 'PV Industry set up behind the Union' at http://www.publiku.com/blog.
php?user=lqbatteryshop&note=186025. Accessed 8 November 2010. 
15   See: 'PV Industry set up behind the Union' at http://www.publiku.com/blog.
php?user=lqbatteryshop&note=186025. Accessed 8 November 2010, and 'China of-
ﬁcially proclaimed photovoltaic industry federation' at http://www.shundasolar.
com/eng/aboutus_news_show.asp?id=251. Accessed 8 November 2010. 
16  This follows from the basic fact that to companies in the Chinese market for renew-
able energy a subsidy is make or break: otherwise they would not be able to compete 
with the coal price of electricity.
17  Though the monopoly is to some extent countered by the Chinese state's role as 
monopsonist, the sole buyer of biomass (Endres 1997: 143).
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